suggested that unless they enforce the bargain it would be a useless and meaningless thing,6 this must be taken largely as a clearing of the throat in the face of a new situation, as a justification for embarking on a new and strange voyage. In commercial life, breach of contract is normally the occasion for nothing at all; it is taken for granted that, for the most part, no attention will be paid to breaches. Probably the next most frequent occurrence is a resort to a negative variety of self-help, typified by the If-he-doesn't-want-to-live-up-to-his-agreements,-I-simply-won'tdeal-with-him-anymore attitude. Only in desperation is there a resort to the courts.
Pari pass the chances are that even if courts did not see their way clear to enforce collective bargains their status in actual life would be much what it is today. Most of them would be lived up to even if the parties knew that there was no legal sanction behind them. The petty breaches would be ignored by both sides. The major breaches, after strong and repeated protests failed, would be solved on the part of the union by striking and on the part of the employers by an announced refusal to deal with an "irresponsible" body and a lockout.7 An optimist might be tempted to say, then, that resort to the courts to remedy breaches of collective agreements is a sign of increasing good will and confidence, of a willingness to substitute orderly means for the more turbulent strike or lockout. A cynic might be tempted to say that it is only when it looks as though these latter methods will fail or after they have failed that anyone ever asks the help of a stranger to the agreement-the court.8 Strangers the courts are today, but strangers they are not remaining. For an increasingly large number of possible controversies are being settled in this way.
As a matter of fact there has been comparatively little dispute in the courts as to whether collective agreements are enforceable.9 Either it has been taken for granted that they are or the objections to enforcement have been brushed aside with but little discussion. When the suit was brought by the union, however, some of the earlier cases refused enforcement on the ground that the wrong remedy had been asked for. Such, for instance, 9. It is assumed hereafter that some means-generally statutory-is provided for suits by and against unincorporated unions.
Not only did the court fail to see that the test to be applied is the uniqueness of the employer rather than the uniqueness of the kind of work done by the plaintiff's members-though, in this respect, the decision would probably not have been any different-but it also misconceived the extent and purpose of the collective bargain. It talked as though a union sold labor over the counter. It forgot that to require the union to forego suit until the term of the agreement had run out would mean breaking down the industrial standards established by the bargain and that suits week by week or month by month, even if they escaped condemnation on other scores, would be a practical impossibility. It failed to realize that the union in its collective capacity had an interest in the agreement apart from the particular wages that its members might collect.'3 And it assumed wrongly that an orderly distribution of the proceeds of a damage suit could be made by the union to its members,14 disregarding, so far as appears here, any possibility that while the defendant may have had only 50 jobs to give out the union may have had 100 unemployed members. So far as New York is concerned, at any rate, this case has completely gone by the boards since the decision in Schlesinger v. Quinto."5 By a fortunate mischance the appellate court allowed this case to appear to be broader than it was in fact and opened the way for the lower New York courts and for the courts of other states to misconceive its scope. In the lower court-before Mr. Justice, now Senator, Wagner-it was treated not as a suit to enjoin breach of a collective agreement but as a suit to enjoin the defendants from forcing others to break the agreement.'6 Its background was a trade agreement entered into between the International Ladies Garment Workers Union on the one side and an employers' association on the other. Originally made in 1919, it was modified in 1921 after a dispute over wages and other conditions of work and the appointment of a gubernatorial commission. While the union and the association were conferring on further possible changes to be made in the agreement, the association resolved to change from a week-work to a piecework basis of production, to reduce wages and to increase hours. It resolved, moreover, that these changes should be made during the term of the agreement. An attempt to put them in force was met by a strike and by this action. The judgment of the lower court granting the injunction requested was affirmed by a divided Appellate Division. To the defendant's contention that such an injunction amounted to an order of specific performance of a contract for personal services, the court replied that it was not a contract for personal services at all but rather an agreement between two organizations,17 each of which had disciplinary power over its members, and that the decree required only that that disciplinary authority be exercised. ' 17. But notice the way in which the agreement is broken down in the lower court to get it to fit the handiest formula. It is treated as a series of agreements between the individual members of the employers' association on the one side and the union on the other. Thus there can be conspiracy by a group of persons and inducement by a third person-the association-to breach the agreement. 18. "The defendants were not required to do anything that they had not agreed to do, nor were they prohibited from doing anything that they had a right to do under the contract." This, of course, is an argument that might be made to justify injunction against breach of any contract.
19. Without attempting to be exhaustive, there have been found at least fifteen successful suits by unions for specific performance or injunction against breach in the lower New York courts from 1928 to 1938. Most of them have come during the last few years. A few particularly deserve a place in any documentary history of American [Vol.48: 195 lective agreements by employers, but it has also had considerable influence outside of that State. In California,20 Georgia Granting that the objection to enforcing the agreement for lack of consideration was well taken in the Iowa case, what of the other objections? The requirement that there be mutuality of remedy as well as mutuality of obligation as a condition precedent to equitable relief has been so fully and completely criticized that it needs little comment here.34 Professor Simpson has seen in these collective bargaining cases a tendency to reject the rule.35 This is a permissible interpretation, particularly in jurisdictions where the rule has been weakened in other types of cases. It is equally possible, however, that these cases will be used in the future as a justification for giving an employer equitable relief against a defaulting union where such relief would not now be given.36
The rule against compelling specific performance of an agreement for personal services is at first glance rather more embarrassing. It has dissolved easily, however, in the hands of courts friendly towards collective agreements. They have got around it by taking a sensible distinction between an agreement to hire a particular person or persons and an agreement to hire unspecified persons from a specified group. In effect they have enunciated a "lump of labor" doctrine, saying, for instance, that "it is the service of a mass of employees" that is involved and that "if one [employee] is unsuitable and incompetent, then the union is prepared to furnish another who is satisfactory."37
The outcome would presumably be different if there were an agreement by the employer to take those particular employees which were fur- nished and selected by the union.38 A decree of specific performance of such an agreement would be a considerable modification of the personal service rule as it is usually stated. Yet such in effect has been the result reached by the Mississippi Supreme Court39 and such in effect is the result of the enforcement of the National Labor Relations Act when the Board orders employers to take back men discharged for union activities. The orders of the Board ignore a doctrine that would otherwise thwart the purpose of the Act. Under them the employer is required to accept specific performance of services in order effectively to preserve the employees' right to choose their union affiliations and to bargain collectively. It may be that experience under the Act will lead equity to reconsider its own rule. For the presumption lying behind the rule is that the defendant will require more supervision than a court of equity can give him, that he will be an unwilling and recalcitrant employer or employee. To the extent that this is the rationale, continued refusal to grant specific performance of personal service contracts against an employer is another instance of the imperfect adjustment of legal doctrine to an industrial society. Though technological change and the growth of the corporate employer do not make the employee work in any less personal sense than he used to, they do warrant inquiry into the weight to be given to the "unwillingness" of the modern corporate employer and they necessitate shifting one's eyes from the corporation to the employee's immediate associates and superiors. It is here that experience under the National Labor Relations Act will be very helpful in assessing the worth of the equity rule. If, in fact, the Board's requiring the employer to rehire a man does not disrupt the plant-if, in fact, though the corporate employer is unwilling, the employee's more immediate associates do not refuse to get along with him-the argument in favor of the modification will be impressive. This does not mean, of course, that specific performance will be ordered in every case in which a contract of employment has been broken. Rather the problem for equity will become one of the adequacy of the remedy at law-granting that the adequacy rule itself remains intact. In the case of an individual or a small group, damages may often be an adequate remedy where in the case of a closed shop provision in a collective agreement sued on by the union they would be inadequate.
These cases in which equitable relief has been refused to the union suggest another problem of some importance, viz., the measure of damages when an action at law is brought by the union-a subject hardly yet touched by the courts.40 Punitive damages, it may be taken for granted, [Vol.48: 195 are out of the question. Compensatory damages, as the term is ordinarily used, may well lead to highly undesirable results if used as a measure of maximum recovery. What is needed in addition is a measure that will as effectively fulfill the purposes of the collective bargain as the compensatory standard fulfills the purposes of commercial contracts. If, as has been argued, the agreement is intended, in any case, to prevent the employer from profiting by competition among workers at a level below that set by the bargain and further, in many cases, to prevent inter-employer competition at the expense of labor standards rather than by increasing efficiency and reducing other costs, the minimum standard will have to be what may be called a "fulfillment" or "maintenance" standard rather than a compensatory or a punitive standard. So stated, the general rule could be formulated thus: A plaintiff union is entitled to damages at least to the extent that the employer has profited by his breach of the collective agreement and, in addition, to any special damages which it can. show and which are left uncompensated by the recovery under the first part of the rule. Thus, in the case of a breach of the wages provision of the agreement, if suit is not or cannot be maintained by or on behalf of the individualemployees,4' the union should be entitled to collect at least the difference between the wages paid and those called for by the terms of the agreement-the amount, that is, that the individual workers could collect if they sued for themselves and that will act as an effective deterrent to further attempts at wage-cutting, not merely the amount which a jury can be convinced (by what must almost necessarily be unsatisfactory evidence) the union has suffered in its collective capacity. If, over and above this, it can show any special damages, these ought also to be awarded. So, too, damages for breach of a closed shop provision ought to be measured by the employer's gain from the breach and, to the extent that these have not already been taken care of, by the losses to the union and to its members from their inability to find work.
Even if this is the rule that ought to apply where a union is suing on the collective bargain, it does not follow that the ordinary measure of damages should be replaced in the case of a breach by the union with doing something equivalent to selling services over the counter and that the ordinary rules apply. Cf. Goldman damages were awarded to a plaintiff employer against incorporated union defendants. The men had refused to work unless they were paid higher wages than those provided for in the collective agreement which also called for preferential hiring of union members so long as they were available. Though the union officers tried to get the men back to work, they refused to go until they had been ordered to do so by a general meeting of the union. Arguing that the agreement lacked consideration because the plaintiff was not bound to send ships to New Orleans to be unloaded and so to give work to the men, and that, in any event, it did not require them to furnish men but merely fixed wages, hours and the conditions to be observed if they did work, the unions sought to escape liability. The court passed by the first of these objections in silence, admitted that there was no obligation in terms in the agreement for the men to work, but awarded damages on the ground that such was the reasonable import of the bargain. The plaintiff asked that the demurrage for the delay be taken as the measure of damages; the court held that "recovery should be confined to what it would have cost for additional wages to unload the ship at the rate demanded,"-in other words, the unavoidable loss-caused to the employer by the strike. Whatever the rule to be applied when the union is plaintiff, this seems to be a reasonable result if the measure of damages is itself to serve the purpose for which, presumably, the agreement is made. On the employer's part, the making of such an agreement-so far as it is purposive at all-is usually for the purpose of getting men to work for him at a scale of wages previously agreed on."4 Their refusal to work will result in a loss to him which is measurable by his loss of business or by the additional cost of conducting his business during the forbidden strike. There is no necessity. in such a situation, for a departure from the normally applicable rules of compensatory damages. Likewise, the general desirability of granting equitable relief at the suit of the union does not require that similar relief be granted in the case of a suit by the employer. Damages are more likely to be an adequate 42. No implication is intended in the next few paragraphs that the only possible breach by a union lies in a forbidden strike or in a refusal to arbitrate; these are, however, the only sorts of breach that have come before the courts. Cf. , the court explained its injunction against striking for higher wages and shorter hours during the term of an agreement which provided a different method for settling disputes thus: "Neither can it be said that an injunction compels the men in the union to return to work. They individually may do so as they see fit. An injunction enjoins the union from calling or continuing a strike in violation of its contractual obligation and doing acts which might be legal were a strike actually in existence." the preliminaries to the strike,47 and still others refuse equitable relief completely.48
The cases so far discussed have all been simple suits to prevent or to recover damages for a breach of the collective agreement. Granting that any breach will give rise to a cause of action to remedy that breach, how serious must the breach be before the other party is entitled to repudiate the agreement? It has been suggested before that the collective agreement is in some ways comparable to a statute. If the agreement is between a single employer and a large group of employees, the obligations which it casts upon the employees take on a good deal of the flavor of duties imposed by a statute, particularly if there has been a dispute within the union ranks as to whether the agreement in question should or should not be accepted. If it is between an employers' association and a union, the same flavor extends to the employers' side as well. The greater the number of individuals bound by the contract, the more likely it is that a breach will occur; the more disparate the group of human beings it seeks to govern, the more likely there is to be an occasional revolt against it. As a tentative suggestion, then, it might be worth considering whether the problems arising from breach and enforcement of a collective bargain are not more readily comparable to those arising out of the breach [Vol. 48: 195 and enforcement of a statute than to the same problems in the case of ordinary commercial contracts-whether, in other words, there is justification for permitting the aggrieved party to consider the bargain off no matter how trivial the breach. Certainly it is within the reasonable expectation of the parties to a trade agreement that not every employer and not every group of union members will, regardless of local conditions, changes in prices and the cost of living, and simple misunderstanding of the terms of the agreement, abide by it strictly at all times. Though the matter has not been discussed in the cases,49 the rules covering breach are probably sufficiently elastic to adjust themselves easily to this situation.50
A second question that arises is this: Admitting that there has been a breach, how great-how serious-a breach is required before either party may resort to self-help? Must the aggrieved side first come to court, or may it take enforcement into its own hands from the outset? In the case of a commercial contract there is not much difficulty with the problem. Where self-help is resorted to, it is generally of a negative variety, a simple refusal to deal with the other party any longer. Except in those comparatively rare instances in which employers are working their plants at top capacity and the union has a virtual monopoly of the supply of highly skilled and essential labor, this is not an available method of forcing compliance with the provisions of a collective bargain.
From the union's point of view at least, a good deal of the practical answer to be given to the question ought to depend on the speed with which the courts function. Granting, for the sake of the argument, that it is more desirable for such disputes to be settled in court than on the picket line, no union can well be expected to rely solely on litigation if there is a long delay in redress while its members are out of work or wages are being cut and while competing employers are being tempted to follow the leader.
The cases on this question are rather few and contradictory.51 More frequently they take another form which provides us with a third question: The virtual unanimity with which the courts test legality vel non by the possible effect on a non-union employee in these cases makes it unnecessary to do more than suggest that there might be other tests-e.g., the effect on the public at large or the effect on employers. The former finds an echo in Curran v. of public policy. If it might operate to prevent some persons from being employed by the firm, or possibly, from remaining in the firm's employment, this is but an incidental feature. Its restrictions were not of an oppressive nature, operating generally in the community to prevent such craftsmen from obtaining employment and from earning their livelihood . . . To coerce workmen to become members of the employes' organization through such a contract, is not the allegation of something which the law will, necessarily, regard as contravening public policy."
The stated rule in this type of case being what it is, one might expect to find a reflection of it in those instances in which an individual nonmember of the union sues because he has been deprived of his job or because he cannot find one. The case would be even stronger if it were a rival union that is suing. One would expect that the individual or the rival union would have a strong cause of action if it could be shown that employment opportunity had been substantially59 lessened by the enforcement of the closed shop rules. A showing that employment opportunity had not been substantially lessened would probably be a good defense. Except in Connecticut,60 however, this test has not been recognized.6' Reading the cases on their facts, the line of cleavage nearly everywhere else appears to be between those in which the non-union plaintiff has lost a job he already had because of a closed shop contract62 59 . I say "substantially" for want of a better term. Between the zero-restraint when no closed shop agreements are in force and the total-restraint when all employers are bound by such agreements-the only two points on the scale that can be definitely located-there is much room for play. An otherwise indefinite term could be made more satisfactory if the court would base its decision on the equality or inequality of the proportion of jobs available to non-union men to the proportion of qualified workers who are non-members. This, of course, would in many cases necessitate a nice inquiry into qualifications for the job. It would also-as do the present cases-require the court to define the area which it considers important. On the latter point, Similarly, one might expect some weight to be given to the rule which is said to govern direct enforcement of a collective bargain when a court is called on to determine the liability of a union for harmful activities directed toward getting a closed shop agreement. One might expect to find picketing or other pressure methods condemned if a substantial part of a given industry, were already tied up with such agreements and one might expect to find them approved-unless the jurisdiction holds them to be bad. regardless of their object-if the industry were not already so tied up. But again, except for a rare instance in New Jersey,67 the cases do not break along this line.68 Whether the suit is brought by an individual employee or a rival union or by an employer, whether it is won or lost, such rationale as there is. in this type of case is phrased in terms of the "right" of the employer to run his plant open-shop if he so pleases or in terms of the "right" of the union members to refuse to work except under such conditions as they please.69 The rationale, to put it differently, is no more than a description of the result following from enforcement of the, decision and the attempted ratio decidendi could better be abbreviated to an admitted fiat.
These two types of cases, of course, are technically distinguishable from that in which we are primarily interested 70-the suit to enforce a closed shop agreement directly. While a court which is willing to sanction a strike or other collective activity for a closed shop is hardly likely to refuse to enforce the resulting agreement, it is quite possible that a court which employer's defense is put squarely on the illegality of such an agreement.74 Both the boards and the courts called on to enforce their orders will have, in such a case, a choice of solutions before them: They may decide, if they are addicted to words, that because such an agreement is "illegal" no order to bargain about it should be issued or enforced. Or they may inquire into the nature of the illegality set up as a defense and, finding that it is illegal in the sense only of being unenforceable75 or, at most, subjecting the union to liability at the suit of a discharged non-union man, decide that it is a fair subject for bargaining. Apart from the effect which a closed shop provision has on the jobsecurity and job-opportunity of non-members, the collective agreement affects or may affect non-members in another way. If the path marked out from the time of Lumley v. Gye to that of the Hitchman case77 is to be followed, we may expect that the courts will, at the instance of a union which has a collective bargain with an employer, enjoin the union's rivals from inducing the employer to break it. And such has been the result in some of the cases.78 It was pointed out above79 that this tort was one of the conceptual foundations of Schlesinger v. Quinto. Since then, however, the New York Court of Appeals has apparently decided that, where a collective agreement is at stake,-at least where an agreement to deal only with a given union is at stake-and where the defendant is a union, the outcome of the case shall turn not on the issue of contract or no-contract, not even on the issue of going relationship or no-going relationship, but on whether the means used to induce the breach are within the bounds of fair persuasion. Such seems to have been its position in Stillwell Theatres v. Kaplan:80 "We would be departing from established precedents if we upheld this injunction. We would thereby give to one labor union an advantage over another by prohibiting the use of peaceful and honest persuasion in matters of economic and social rivalry. This might strike a death blow to legitimate labor activities. It is not within the province of the courts to restrain conduct which is within the allowable area of economic conflict."
The way in which the question was presented to the court-it was an application by a group of employers to restrain activities "calculated to induce or cause" them to break their contracts with a rival of the defendant union-may have given the court the opportunity to reach the result it did,81 but it seems fairly clear that the outcome would have been the same even if, as in the more usual case, the plaintiff had been the actual promisee of the bargain.82
The pressure method employed in the Stillwell case was picketing of the employer's place of business. Other considerations aside, the result of the case is particularly welcome at a time when two national labor unions are fighting each other. So far, at least, as the appeal is to the employer's customers, such picketing is a fair way of informing the public of the dispute and of permitting it to express its sympathy for or antipathy towards one or the other of the rivals. To forbid it would be to hide from the patron information which might influence his choice. Such a result, moreover, implicitly recognizes a solidarity of interest between an employer and his employees.83 If loss of customers has been an allowable method in the past for persuading employers to deal with a union, loss of work via loss of customers may be an allowable method for persuading employees to shift their allegiance from one union to another.84 The pressure may, in other words, be as much directed towards inducing the employees to become members of another group as it is towards inducing the employer to discharge his workers and to give their jobs to another group. With this turn in outlook, one of the original justifications for pressure on the employer-rivalry for jobs-is forgotten and there is substituted for it an end-the strengthening of the union itself-which is still looked on askance by more conservative courts. But accepting this as a legitimate end, another desideratum, the openness of the union which is putting on the pressure, is suggested. This, in turn, might better be used as a criterion for determining legality vel non in the case of a closed shop agreement than the test now applied.85 Openness 91. This will be qualified, of course, by the willingness of the Board, State or Federal, to order elections. The prevailing rule of the National Board is not to order an election more often than once a year unless strong cause is shown. Most unions are opposed to long term agreements in any event. But with the present strong conflict between two [Vol. 48: 195 A further problem to which attention is invited by the growth of the collective bargaining system is the status of the collective agreement when an employer goes into an insolvency court. It is a problem, not heretofore acute, which may be of considerable importance the next time a wave of business failures hits the country. Its setting is suggested by the situation in In re Mamie Conti Gowns, Incorporated.92 The court, immediately after approving a petition for reorganization under ? 77B, was faced with an application by the debtor to be permitted to discard a collective agreement by which it was bound. Pointing out that the agreement had been made after a long dispute in the industry and that the petitioner's great excess of assets over liabilities raised doubts as to whether the whole of the proceeding had not been instituted in an effort to discard the agreement rather than to effect a reorganization as contemplated by the Act, the court disallowed the petition.93 To the debtor's claim that the closed shop provision of the agreement ran counter to the statutory prohibition against requiring employees to join or not to join a union, the court's reply was that that objection could be raised only by an employee. Beyond this, however, the petitioner urged that the whole agreement be discarded under the court's authority to order rejection of executory contracts. It was urged particularly that relief under the Act was necessary "because its [the petitioner's] labor expenses, pursuant to the contract, were out of all proportion to its volume of business and that no feasible plan of reorganization providing for a fair prospect of profit in the future can be put forth as long as the contract remains in force." This, too, the court rejected, pointing out that the collective agreement itself provided for reorganizations, leaving the inference that it thought the granting of the application would give the petitioner an unwarranted advantage over its competitors. That it would have given the petitioner this advantage is clear.
Whatever the legal theory of insolvency proceedings may be, they are, in their economic effects, useful as a means of writing off a top-heavy capital structure and of readjusting production costs to changes in the price level. One asks whether this rehabilitation ought also to carry with it permission to compete with lowered labor costs. There are respectable authorities who argue, and there are cogent reasons for believing, that wholesale cuts in the spending power of the lower income groups do not rival groups, attempts may be made to hamstring a situation by writing an agreement for more than one or a few years. It may be, of course, that different provisions of the collective bargain will yield to different treatment in the reorganization court. Certainly, so far as a closed shop provision is concerned, there is no reason, except that wages are likely to be lower in an open shop, for giving greater latitude to an insolvent firm than is permitted others. Nor would there seem to be any good reason for permitting seniority provisions, for instance, to go into the discard. And, if the belief set out above is justified, there is good reason for not disrupting the painfully worked out labor standards -wages, hours, and working conditions-contained in such bargains, particularly if they are common throughout an industry. To allow an employer to gain an advantage over his competitors by cutting down wages, increasing hours, or lowering the conditions under which his employees work would be an admission that he is entitled to compete on whatever level he can regardless of the public effect or the social cost of that competition -an admission that a company which cannot stand the gaff even with a devalued plant and deflated liabilities is entitled to make and market its product at lower labor standards than other firms. Such an admission in the case of one firm would be likely to force a similar admission for all of its similarly situated competitors. The bankruptcy of management could lead to the bankruptcy of collective bargaining. One cannot, then, but approve of the court's rejection of the application and inquire whether the law of this case ought not to be written into the law of the land to avoid trouble in the future.
Not all the cases that we have had in the past have turned out so fortunately as did In re Mamie Conti Gowns.94 In one instance it has been held that an equity receiver takes over the management, free from any duty theretofore cast on the company not to discharge workers without cause and, if demanded, a hearing.95 In another, it has been held that though a receiver proceeded to arbitrate a wage dispute as provided in the collective agreement, no suit for back wages could be maintained on the award after all the property, together with all liabilities incurred during receivership, had been turned back to the company, on the ground that neither the collective agreement nor the arbitration award had been adopted THE YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol.48: 195 by the court.96 Even administrative rulings and the acts of Congress under which they were made-to pursue an analogy suggested above-have not escaped. Though Mr. Justice Holmes phrased his position cautiously in holding that the Adamson Act's wages and hours provisions did not apply to a railroad in receivership -pointing out that the law had been enacted in great haste, he wrote: "We cannot suppose that it was meant to forbid work being done at a less price than the rates laid down, when both parties to the bargain wished to go on as before and when the circumstances of the road were so exceptional that the lower compensation would not affect the market for labor upon other roads"-his few words on the possibility of a constitutional issue were seized on by inferior courts to justify a refusal to apply similar statutes to other insolvent corporations. Without considering the matter further, they proceeded on the assumption that to require an insolvent road to pay the wages prescribed by decisions of the Railway Labor Board would constitute a taking of property without due process of law.98 It may be that under the circumstances prevailing in these cases the decisions were correct. If so, they ought not to be extended carelessly to cases where they are unwarranted. member sue on the collective agreement? Were it not for an exaggerated notion of the importance of privity of contract, there would be little difficulty in answering the question. As it is, however, whether as counsel or as court, we have to go through a long rigamarole chock-full of doctrinally persuasive terminology to get a desirable result. Doctrine aside, the essential problems in deciding whether an individual may sue on a collective agreement are much the same as those involved in deciding whether he may sue under a minimum wage statute which is itself silent on the subject. The proper inquiries are: Was the statute intended, inter alia, for his benefit? Can his benefit, and that of others, be best preserved if we adopt this as one method of enforcing its provisions? Is there any good reason why it should not be enforced in this way?
City of Phoenix v. Drinkwaterloo provides us with a line of reasoning that could well be applied to the collective bargaining cases if we were prepared to admit that they are at all comparable in social aim or in doctrinal solution. Here the statute in question required municipal corporations to pay their employees specified wages. It imposed a penalty for failure to pay those wages, but made no provision for a civil action by an individual to collect the wages. Yet the court allowed recovery of the statutory amount by a worker who had accepted less, apparently without protest.10' The mere fact of his employment was held to obligate the city to pay him the full statutory amount: "The statute, it will be seen, has a two-fold purpose. One is to secure to the individual workman a minimum living wage, fixed by law, and the other is to penalize the employer who fails to pay that wage. With both purposes before us, we certainly think that it would be defeating the intent of the Legislature, so far as the first is con- cerned, if we were to hold that the very ones whom the law was intended to protect were helpless to secure that protection, and must satisfy themselves with knowing that somebody had gone to jail or paid a fine for violating the law. Such would, indeed, be a Pyrrhic victory for the workman, consoling perhaps to his feelings, but of very little value in giving to him what the law says he has earned and is due him." 102 Substitute for "legislature" and "statute," "union and employer," and "collective agreement" respectively, eliminate the notion of penalty, and add, what is already implicit in the statute, the notion of preventing competition below the wage level set by it, and the argument fits as well for a collective bargain as it does for an act of the legislature.
If something closer to the contract pattern presented by the collective bargain is called for, there are the cases in which a public contractor, bound by an agreement with the government to pay a specified rate of wages to his employees, is sued by an employee.'03 And there are the cases which arose while the President's Re-employment Agreement was in force.'04 In both instances, without much difficulty, the courts generally allowed recovery. Why then all the fuss and bother over permitting a union member to sue on his collective agreement? The answer lies at least partly in verbal difficulties. peace or under the stress of a strike or lockout resembles in many ways a treaty." To the same class belongs M. Duguit's characterization of it as "a law establishing permanent relationship between two social groups, the legal rule according to which the individual contracts between members of these two groups are to be concluded."'106 Hardly less rhetorical is Judge Sibley's further attempt at delineation-"a mutual general offer to be closed by specific acceptances."'107 As indicating the results which will flow from the presence of a collective bargain these suggestions leave much to be desired, however adequately they may indicate the general outlook or hopes of the writers. The term begins to acquire apparent legal significance when it becomes a custom-a practice which is "certain, general, uniform, and recognized" 108-or a usage-"an established method of dealing, adopted in a particular place, or by those engaged in a particular vocation or trade."109 A New York court suggests two more ideas in one sentence when it calls the agreement "a contract made by his representative for his benefit" 1"0-that the individual employee is a party to a contract made on his behalf by the union as agent"' and that he is a third party beneficiary of the contract."2 Ill fitting though they may be, it is these last three that represent the more common expression of the courts. 113
These attempts to force a new relationship into old molds could well be criticized at the verbal level. To call a deliberate agreement arrived at after prolonged deliberation, presumably subject to change by the parties' mutual consent, and existing, by its own terms, for a specified period, a "custom" or a "usage," is stretching the terms a bit further than they have heretofore been stretched."14 To call the union an agent for its members raises doubts: What, for instance, is the status of an agent the result of whose negotiations or whose very authority to make [Vol. 48: 195 the agreement in the first place may have been voted against by the same "principal" who is now suing on the contract? To designate the member a third party beneficiary-akin to the unborn child named for the promisor or the named beneficiary of a life insurance policy-raises similar questions, for this is a "third party" who may have participated in the making of the agreement, who may have voted against it, who may have asked for a better bargain than the one that was actually made, and who is, in practically every case, a part of the party who made the agreement. Doubtless sufficient dialectic can make these quibbles seem small. Analogy, if refined and abstract enough, can induce us to believe that a collective agreement in an industry is sufficiently "like" a custom-a something taken for granted as long as it exists, not deliberately made by the person who is now before the court-to be treated as such. Dialectic, if sufficiently refined, can also point out that like Rousseau's perfect democrat the member of the trade union owes his first duty to the will of the majority. He is at best but one of many in his organization; his individual will has but small part in making a minority into a majority or a majority into a minority. Having abided by the will of the majority, whether that will is his will or not, he is entitled to profit by whatever bargain that will made for him; and this applies to him whether he be treated as a principal represented in the negotiations by the will of the majority or as a third party outside of that will completely.
One need not continue along this line. It is more important to ask what the consequences of adopting one or another of these concepts is, how far they have been adopted as judged by their "normal" consequences, and how far these consequences-assuming them to be spelled out for the collective agreement as they have been for other types of transactionmake it desirable for the courts to adopt one or another, to blend them, or to work out a concept which, if not entirely new, is at least somewhat different from either the pure stuff or the amalgam which may result from these. The words we use may suggest the result in an unsettled situation; they do not dictate it. One must take the formalistic language as descriptive rather than as definitive. The mold is not yet sufficiently set, one may hope, to leave no way of escape.
With this in mind we inquire briefly into the creation of the individual member's interest. Is it enough for the plaintiff-member to come into court saying "I am a member of the union. My union has an agreement with the defendant that I will not be discharged without a hearing. I have been discharged without a hearing and I want damages," or must he say more? If this collective agreement is to be treated as a custom, it ought to be that no more is required. If the union be his agent, what more can be required unless we are pushed into the field of ostensible and express authority? If he be a third party beneficiary, surely by the law of the cases no more is necessary.
But how do the cases hold? In the factual tests that they set up, they break into three groups. The cases in one group are in accord with the results that would be expected under the nominally accepted doctrines."5 A minority group is in total disagreement with them; they hold that, for the collective bargain to be of effect in an employee-employer suit, something more than mere membership-as, for instance, "acceptance" or "ratification" of the agreement-must be shown."6 The third group, which may in the end turn out to be a false class, appears to be satisfied with a showing that there was an agreement and that the member knew would otherwise have too much incentive to displace union with nonunion men, but that "With the rate of pay . . . fixed and secured to all employees, the inducement, and the only inducement, that would exist to let out union members and let in non-union men, would disappear. Thus the interest of the union members in respect to the rate of pay was substantially tied into or united with that of nonunion men, including colored train employees; and the contract results in this manner to and for the benefit of all of them so far as the rates of pay were concerned; and, being so, appellant as a third party in interest could accept and rely on its benefits in respect to the rate of pay and sue for the same."'23 Such cases as this one, however, assume or find a contract between the principal parties in the background. Suppose there is no such finding or assumption? How, for instance, if there is no consideration to support the employer's promises to the union? Can the employee, member or nonmember, still sue on it? One wonders: If this is a "custom" as to the employee, why not? Hasn't it been precisely in those cases in which the court was unable to find a contract that it looked for "custom"? So it appears.'24 But if there is no contract between union and employer, then what of the individual who is the union's "principal"? Still there was a holding out by the employer-a holding out on terms suggested by the union-"a general offer to be closed by a specific acceptance." And if the individual be a third-party beneficiary? It looks as though dialectic headed for a result has broken down. He may sue, to be sure, but his suit will be in quantum meruit or some equivalent; certainly he cannot sue on an agreement that isn't. result will be otherwise.'25 And if the employee is treated as a third party beneficiary, the result would seem to be the same as it is in the cases where there is no consideration or a failure of consideration.
The failure of consideration problem may arise if the union breaks its promises. Can a custom thus easily be broken? If a custom can be established by a definite act there is no apparent reason why it cannot be disestablished by an equally definite act. If the latter is true, it would seem that the worker who continues to work in spite of, say, the strike, cannot maintain his suit, unless those cases in which the custom exists regardless of consideration set the precedent to be followed here. The union-as-agent notion breeds an equally nice question. The agent has broken the agreement, the principal has not. Or did the principal promise the employer personally that there would be no strikes? Then the agent's striking is a breach of the principal's promise even though the principal himself keeps on working while the agent is on strike. Perhaps, in order to make more sense, we had better read it to mean only that the principal will not participate in a strike. But if the employee is a third party, shall he continue to benefit even when the promisor has broken his promise to the promisee? The underlying bargain has been broken; presumably it is gone completely. The analysis would yield a negative answer to the question except for the effect of an analogous situation.
Suppose the employer and the union get together and agree, during the term of the contract, that changes shall be made. The custom has changed, to be sure, but the employee agreed to work according to the terms of the old custom. It might be urged on this ground that he retains his rights in spite of the change. But since in all probability he is employed at will, is not his employment from this day forth in terms of the new custom, that way of doing things that is so well known, so certain, so stable, and so oft-repeated that men are presumed to have contracted with reference to it ? Perhaps, but the answer is far from clear. If, however, the employee is principal and the union is agent, we run into still another question, that of the authority of the union to make changes for him.'26 He denies the authority to make this change, for it works to his detriment. But, as a loyal member of the union, has he not agreed beforehand to acquiesce in anything the majority does? Then perhaps he has agreed though he disagrees, and he has to take the change whether he likes it or not. But the third party beneficiary, it is laid down in case and text, acquires his rights as soon as the underlying agreement comes into existence and nothing can thereafter change them unless-and here is a lovely spot for an implication !-the privilege of changing has been reserved in the first place. So, unless we can spell waiver out of his being a member of the union, the employer is still obligated to him even though his organization If we say that the agreement is, for the individual, a custom, surely he can agree to terms other than those there set forth. If we say that he is a third-party beneficiary, the same result will probably follow. If we say that he is a principal and the union an agent, cannot the principal and the other contracting party call off the agreement? Undoubtedly yes, unless, as is extremely unlikely, agency coupled with an interest can be spelled out of the relationship between the union and its members. But the custom may be a contract between the principal parties, the agent may turn out to be a principal if it sues to enforce the agreement itself and the union is clearly entitled to sue if the third party agrees to take less than the agreement calls for. On the effect on the enforcement of the bargain by the union of a member's agreeing to terms lower than those of the agreement, we have no case law. But on its effect on the member's own suit we do.
The tendency of the cases is pretty clearly in the direction of saying that an inconsistent agreement between employer and employee is no bar to the latter's suing on the collective bargain. Only one decision, however, adopts the rule as a rule.'33 The others go on the ground that the private bargain was made without knowledge of the collective agreement134 or that the quantum of evidence required to show that the inconsistent proposal was accepted by the worker is, apparently, greater than usual.135 The same was true in a Pennsylvania case in which the defendant employer, sued for wages, sought to withhold an amount equal to the "fine" of a dollar a day provided in the bargain for the event of an unauthorized strike.141 Different, it seems, is the position of a nonunion member, for the Kentucky court has held in Gregg v. Starks142 that, since he was not a party to an agreement between a railroad and the union to arbitrate differences, he could not be bound by the arbitration award.
None of these is a strong case; most appear to be simple assertions by the court without issue raised. A more difficult problem comes in deciding whether the burdens of the agreement can be got rid of by resignation from an employers' association or from a union and whether, by a similar resignation, rights are lost. Customs go on willy-nilly and withdrawal might be expected to make no difference. If the agency be a continuing one-a series of acts constructively repeated day after day and week after week-resignation might divest the member of his rights and duties; but if the work of the agent was an act done once and for all, there would be no such effect. And the third-party beneficiary, if he would have come within the terms of the agreement without having been a member in the first place, would presumably continue to be such even after he had resigned. Contrariwise, if membership was a prerequisite to inclusion within the terms of the agreement, his subsequent withdrawal would make a difference. Most of the cases that have considered the matter allow this mode of escape,143 but the recent swing appears to be in the other direction. 144 WVe have, finally, one other question: It is to be noticed that suits brought by individual employees under collective agreements have centered around three problems exclusively-wages, seniority and wrongful discharge. Is this to be taken to mean that these, and similar, questions are the only ones that may be litigated by the individual or does it mean merely that they are the only ones that have been so litigated? To put it another way, may the individual sue on the collective agreement to protect any interest that by any possibility may accrue to him under the agreement, or does enforcement of some provisions belong to the union exclusively? May the individual, for instance, sue to enjoin breach of an agreement to run closed shop, or does that privilege to sue belong to the union? Conversely, if the individual sues for wages-more strongly, if a number of individuals, sue for wages-may the union organization agree with the employer to waive this portion of the bargain? One can imagine instances where the union might well be justified in making some arrangement even after the individual's asserted ''rights" had accrued to him; one can also imagine instances in which a perverse or lackadaisical union leadership, solidly entrenched, would fail to assert proper claims against the employer to the detriment of the union membership. The answer to this sort of question is yet to be found. But the analysis we have already gone through makes it clear that no satisfactory solution lies in the question-begging assertion of the Louisiana court'45 that "The plaintiff is limited to an enforcement of his individual rights under the contract. He cannot champion the rights of the local union as a whole."
Probably the answer was a good one in the particular instance. Probably also the solution lies in a working out of some trade union equivalent to the stockholder's suit in corporate law. In any event the solution, if there is any and whatever it is, lies in the future.
We come, then, practically to the point at which we started. To attempt to write about or to state "the law of the collective bargain" as it applies to the individual employee is to attempt to write about or to state something which does not exist. True, there are cases, perhaps a hundred or so all told. But there is no body of doctrine, in any sense of the word, to which reference can be made to predict the outcome of as yet unsettled questions. It can hardly even be said that there are standards, let alone a frame, of reference. We are still engaged, in this domain of enforcement of individual rights and duties under the agreement, in threshing out even the barest fundamentals of law. Older cases carry little weight and the meaning of new ones, for lack of a context, is indeterminate. A particular point here and there is being "settled," but how long it will remain settled is still to be seen. No well thought out line of attack, such as existed fifteen or twenty years ago when Walter Gordon Merritt and a flourishing League for Industrial Rights were engaged in developing a vast body of legal obstacles to labor's ambitions, exhibits itself in the cases either from labor's side or from that of the employer. have what is assumed to be the proper method for developing a common law on any subject-cases coming haphazardly to the courts, counsel changing from case to case, no firm assertion, no iteration and reiteration, of "principles" which, even in our stage of the game, will have to be threshed out if there is to be certainty under collective bargaining. Presumably we have got beyond the stage of arguing whether collective agreements ought to be enforced at law. But we have not got far beyond it, Verbalisms abound and old formulae are turned to or ignored as seems best at the moment. Perhaps the Massachusetts court, seeming to ignore the words that other courts resort to-"custom", "agent", "third party beneficiary"-is taking the wiser course in choosing a comparatively new and untainted word-"member"'"46-and filling it up with content as the cases come. Deliberately chosen or not, consciously or unconsciously, some such route as this will have to be, and is being, followed by the other courts as well. And this, I take it, is the common law equivalent of M. Duguit's warning to the French legislators of twenty years ago: "The truth is that although collective labor contracts have multiplied . . . the time has not yet come for legislative action. We have here an institution which is still in the process of formation and is far from its complete development."'147
